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INTRODUCTION 
For almost three decades, all Western societies have been experiencing a 
sharp decrease in the labor market participation of older adults. The UK 
has been no exception. The research on this topic has concentrated 
mainly on early retirement pathways and their determinants (Blundell & 
Johnson, 1999a; Blundell et al., 2002; Meghir & Whitehouse, 1997). 
However, the impact of recent reforms as a response to the financial 
burden of aging population poses the question of the adequacy of the 
current pension system in times of flexibilization of labor markets. Still, 
there is little research on the impact of destabilization of later careers on 
pension income and income inequalities in later life.  
Like in most OECD countries, the demand for workers and their skills 
in the UK has changed significantly over the last few decades. 
Researchers explain these changes in demand primarily in terms of 
technological change, changes in work organization, and growing 
international trade (Castells, 2000). These factors induced employers to 
apply more often numerical and wage flexibility strategies. These have 
also been fostered by an uncoordinated market economy (Regini, 2000). 
The influence of trade unions was reduced and the collective bargaining 
system abolished, which opened the way for flexible wage bargaining. 
Furthermore, the radical commercialization of the public sector induced 
many firms to exchange secure for insecure contracts and to outsource 
workers or to transfer traditional work to own-account workers (Ladipo 
& Wilkinson, 2002).  
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Within the context of these changes on the labor market, we will examine 
how these flexibility strategies affect the employment careers of older 
workers. Destabilization of later careers might have a negative effect not 
only on the earning trajectories at the end of the career, but also on 
pension income: especially since the pension systems have been designed 
for typical male career profiles of the postwar period on the assumption 
of a continuous full-time employment career. Furthermore, we will 
investigate which groups are especially prone to flexibility strategies and 
whether social inequality patterns have changed.  
Using the British Household Panel Survey, this paper investigates the 
following topics: (1) an analysis of the employment career of older 
workers with a focus on the income mobility and the risk of becoming 
unemployed might shed light on the destabilization thesis of later careers. 
(2) We will analyze the transition to retirement and pension income. We 
will begin this study with an overview of UK institutions with a focus on 
the change in labor demand in the UK between 1990 and 2005. Then, the 
section of data and methods used to examine older workers’ careers will 
be followed by a presentation of results. A final summary will conclude 
this working paper.  
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
Employment System and industrial restructuring 
The UK economic system can be classified as an uncoordinated market 
economy with decentralized and dualistic systems of industrial 
relationships. Uncoordinated market economies are characterized by a 
lack of coordination between corporative bodies, such as the financial 
sector, firms, trade unions, and employers' associations. In contrast to 
coordinated market economies, the British economic system does not 
compete on the world market so much by producing high quality goods, 
but rather by offering high-quality services (Soskice, 1991, 1999). In 
turn, the British production regime determines the kind of employment 
relationships. They can be described as low-trust relationships and they 
do not require craftsmen with solid vocational training. Thus, employers 
are reluctant to invest in on-the-job training, especially for lower-skilled 
and low service workers.  
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Self-improvement market ideology in the UK and low employment 
protection legislation (EPL) enable companies in the UK to adjust to 
technological and organizational changes and the volatilities of the global 
markets by transferring the risk to individuals (Breen, 1997). Therefore, 
companies in the UK are less timid to apply flexible forms of work to 
their employees than in coordinated market economies (Regini, 2000). 
Intra and inter job mobility is high, and individual resources, such as 
education, networks and job experience, are crucial factors in protecting 
workers against market risks (DiPrete et al., 1997). Social groups lacking 
these resources are at a higher risk of job hopping between low-paid jobs 
with inactivity gaps in between. A loose institutional link between 
vocational certificates and occupations, combined with low EPL, 
facilitates mobility between industries and occupations, even for older 
workers. Fear of poaching makes firms unwilling to invest in job-specific 
vocational skills of their employees. Thus, firms prefer workers with 
higher education and invest rather in transferable skills (Soskice, 1991).   
The conservative government under Margaret Thatcher introduced 
labor market reforms aimed at the deregulation of the labor market. The 
impact of these reforms on the increase of flexible forms of work can 
hardly be considered a mono-causal explanation for the increase of 
flexible forms of employment, since the labor market in the UK was 
already highly flexible before the 1980s (Deakin & Reed, 2000). 
Employment protection regulation (EPL) was already quite low before 
the 1980s for both permanent and temporary contracts with no significant 
changes between the late 1980s and late 1990s. Regulation even shifted 
slightly towards stricter labor market regulations from the late 1990s to 
2003 (OECD, 2004). However, reforms aiming at the retrenchment of 
social security programs played an important part in increasing income 
insecurities. The restriction of the influence of trade unions opened the 
way for flexible wage bargaining, which shifted wage negotiation to the 
firm and individual level.    
The deindustrialization of the economy and changes in technology, 
increasing demand for services, and the growing trade with low-wage 
countries are far more plausible explanations for the destabilization of 
employment careers in the UK. Until 1970, there was a strong demand 
for skilled and semi-skilled workers and enough jobs for unskilled 
workers. Since then, the British economy has experienced the most 
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dramatic decline of traditional industries among all OECD countries. In 
the period between 1970 and 2003, the share of manufacturing jobs 
declined monotonically from 35 percent to 15 percent (Rowthorn & 
Coutts, 2004). The British manufacturing industry has seen the near 
disappearance of the coal industry in Wales during the 1980s, a serious 
decline in train-manufacturing plants, as well as the downfall of the 
shipbuilding and the car manufacturing industry (Black, 2004). In 
contrast to the rest of OECD countries, the declining share of 
manufacturing jobs was not compensated by the increasing productivity 
of manufacturing jobs: the UK manufacturing sector has experienced 
thirty years of almost stagnant per capita output (Rowthorn & Coutts, 
2004). In comparison to the manufacturing sector, the productivity of the 
knowledge-based service sector (finance and business services such as 
consulting, computer and information services) has grown significantly in 
the last decades. This in turn led to the further devaluation of jobs in 
traditional industries. Indeed, non-service employment is one of the 
lowest paid sectors in the UK. For comparison, the non-service sector in 
Germany is the second best-paid sector, ranging just below business 
sector (Fagan et al., 2005). At the same time, the privatization of major, 
state-controlled firms in the 1980s (including British Aerospace, British 
Telecom, British Leyland, Rolls-Royce, and British Steel) had an impact 
not only on the ‘periphery,’ but also on the core workforce, especially in 
industries providing services. Thus, the privatization of state industries 
should not only have intensified the application of flexible forms of work 
in the private service sector, but should also have made it possible to 
apply flexible strategies to workers in manufacturing industry.  
The impact of recent economic changes on older workers in a self-
regulating market with low EPL and open employment relationships can 
be summarized as the spread of market risks and decline of social 
protection.  
 
Labor force participation and unemployment  
The labor force participation rates are shown in Figure 1. Among men 
ages 55 to 59, the labor force participation rate decreased from 83 percent 
in 1984 to 75 percent in the mid 1990s and then increased slightly again. 
The labor force participation rate of men in the 60–64 age group was 60 
percent of 1984, bottomed out at 50 percent in 1996, and increased 
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steadily again to 60 percent in 2005. The participation of women ages 55 
to 59 has increased continuously since 1984s from about 50 to 63 percent. 
Though, women’s statutory retirement age is 60 participation rates of 
women aged 60-65 grew from 20 to 30 percent. The drop of participation 
rates for men but increasing rates for women in 1980s and at the 
beginning of the 1990s could be interpreted in terms of the transformation 
of the economy from traditional industries towards service society. Rising 
activity rates for men and women since 1997 suggest that the improving 
economic situation and measures targeted at increasing the participation 
of older workers (reduction of pension benefits, tighter eligibility for 
disability benefits (from 1995), in-work benefits and training incentives 
for unemployed (from 2002) reversed this trend. Figure 2 demonstrates 
that, after a short recession between 1991 and 1994, the UK experienced 
an economic boom, accompanied by decreasing unemployment rates.  
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Figure 1: Participation rates for men and women  
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate and GDP 
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Welfare arrangements and pension systems  
 
Welfare regimes play a crucial role in channelling employment 
insecurities in later life by labor market policies and the pension system. 
Since the Labor Party came to power in 1997, the new government has 
launched a set of reforms that have partially reversed previous policies. 
Though New Labor stayed on the deregulation path, there has been a shift 
towards active labor market policies, moving from welfare benefit receipt 
to welfare-to-work policy. First, New Labor strove to improve the quality 
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of labor supply by launching the New Deal program, which is aimed at 
the integration of disadvantaged groups (young and old workers) into the 
labor market. This program tries to improve the quality of the labor force 
with re-training measures on the one hand, and discourage unemployment 
by reducing unemployment insurance benefits on the other hand. Second, 
statutory National Minimum Wage was implemented to encourage low-
qualified workers to look for a job. Third, through Earned Income Tax 
Credits, New Labor sought to channel many of the unemployed into low 
wage service jobs (Dickens et al., 2003; Rubery, 1989). Furthermore, 
following the EU’s Part-time Directive, statutory rights for part-time 
workers have been put on par with those available to full-time workers.  
The British pension system followed Beveridgean social policy, which 
is characterized by universal provision, entitlements based on residence 
and need, with flat rate benefits and financed through general taxation. 
The Beveridge pension system has two tiers of provision (plus the third 
voluntary tier provisions: savings and insurances). The first tier is 
publicly provided tax-financed pension and targets the low earners. This 
pension is unrelated to earnings. The entitlement to a full benefit requires 
forty-four-years of contributions for men and thirty-nine years for 
women. Replacement rates are extremely low, covering only 15 percent 
(in 2002) of average male earnings (Disney et al., 2003). Reforms 
facilitating women’s entitlements and increasing levels of participation at 
the labor market allowed for the coverage of the vast majority of the 
youngest retirement cohorts with full basic pension (Johnson & Stears, 
1996). ‘Fair’ actuarial adjustments for delaying employment exits beyond 
the official retirement age (rewarded by 7.5% a year) and low 
replacement rates provide incentives for delaying retirement decisions. In 
this context, it should be noted that income from a basic state pension is 
lower than means-tested benefits, which force many (early) retires to rely 
on other income sources.  
While there are no alternatives to the state pension of the first tier, there 
are several options on the second tier. Like the first tier, the second tier 
also is mandatory, but only accessible for those employees who earn 
above the lower earnings limit (LEL). The State Earnings Related 
Pension Scheme (SERPS) was introduced in 1978 and aimed to provide 
one fourth of the best twenty years of earnings (Blundell & Johnson, 
1999a; Blundell & Johnson, 1999b). However, SERPS never intended to 
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become a universal scheme for all employees. Workers who already 
belonged to an occupational pension with higher pension income 
guarantee could contract out of the state scheme. This applied to more 
than half of all employees and mainly for male employees (Blundell et 
al., 2002).  
Private pensions (second tier) include occupational pensions and 
individual retirement accounts, known in the United Kingdom as 
Personal Pensions (Blundell et al., 2002). Occupational pension is the 
most important income source in later life (for example, after forty years 
in service, occupational pension covers about two-thirds of the final 
earnings). Occupational pensions currently cover around 45 percent of 
employees and are typically defined benefit (DB) schemes (Blundell et 
al., 2002). Lower earners are less likely to be members of an occupational 
pension scheme than higher earners and are also less likely to contribute 
to any kind of private arrangements (Blundell & Johnson, 1999a). Lower 
earners are more likely to be contracted into less favorable SERPS 
because they are not offered any occupational pensions by their 
employers. As already mentioned, in the case that they earn below the 
lower earnings limit, they do not accrue any second-tier pension rights at 
all. In 1988, the British government introduced defined-contribution (DC) 
pension schemes (personal or stakeholder pensions), and many 
employees switched to DC provisions already in the first few years. In 
contrast to defined benefit (DB) schemes based on years of service, DC 
schemes are based on contributions being made into a fund. The reason 
for introducing the DC scheme was concern about the cost of SERPS. 
The government sought to cut projected public pension expenditure 
(Disney et al., 2003). DC plans now cover more than one-third of 
employees with private pensions (Banks & Blundell, 2005; Banks & 
Smith, 2006). Defined contribution schemes will affect the retirement 
behavior and the pension income of the youngest retirement cohorts. 
In the context of our analysis, it is important to note that the only early 
retirement route via work related pensions is through occupational 
pensions or personal pensions. Given the different pension types, there 
are various mechanisms that influence early retirement behaviour. For 
older workers relying only on state pension benefits (first or second tier) 
with official retirement age of 60 for women and 65 for men, early exits 
are only possible via inactivity. In contrast, people with occupational 
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pension contributions are able to transit directly into (early) retirement 
using their occupational pensions. However, there are also significant 
differences for the last group. While voluntary retirement via 
occupational pensions penalizes early retires, the early exits at the 
employer’s request provide much more generous provisions. The 
pensions for early retirements for health reasons are also relatively 
generous (Blundell & Johnson, 1999a). Furthermore, because of high 
variety of occupational pension provisions, there are ‘bad’ scheme 
provisions that offer only low replacement rates, as well as ‘good’ 
schemes that offer high replacement rates at early retirement (Hansen, 
2000). The move from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes 
shifted the risks increasingly onto individuals. Thus, retirement behavior 
of individuals with contribution schemes (usually personal pensions) is 
hard to predict since retirement behavior depends on economic situation, 
pension wealth of individuals, and unobservable decisions (like couple 
retirement). However, lower contribution rates of DC plans compared to 
the DB schemes imply lower final pension wealth, which might result in 
delayed retirements for individuals with DC plans.  
Even though the UK displays the highest employment rates and lowest 
expenditure for their pension system among other European countries, the 
British government also introduced many reforms aimed at retrenching 
early retirements and reducing state pensions. The British government 
changed the legislation for regular retirement schemes, restricted the 
early exits via disability pensions, and equalized the retirement age 
between men and women. The conservative government of Margaret 
Thatcher has cut back the generosity of state pension provisions. The 
indexation of the basic state pension from earnings to prices in 1982 
devaluated the basic pension compared to average earnings (about 6% 
between 1980 and 2002). Reforms to SERPS in 1986 and 1995 have 
reduced pension wealth from 25% of the best twenty years to 20% of the 
best 40 years of contribution. This will decrease pension income for 
workers retiring after 2000 (Blundell & Johnson, 1999a).  
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EFFECTS ON LATE CAREERS AND PENSION INCOME 
Changes over time 
As it was argued before, the restructuring of the economy, the increase in 
the demand for services, and growing trade with low-wage countries 
might destabilize the employment careers and income trajectories of older 
workers. Since the pension system had been initially designed for male 
full-time workers in traditional industries contributing to pension systems 
without interruption, the destabilization of late careers might have 
negative consequences on the pension income for those individuals of the 
retirement cohorts who have experienced a destabilization of their 
working career.  
With the destabilization thesis, we argue that older people might bear a 
disproportionate part of the consequences of the demand shift on the 
labor market. First, uncoordinated market economies like the UK re-
adjust to new economic challenges not so much by improving well-
established industries, but rather by investing in newer fields of 
technology (Soskice, 1999). The UK economy was also successful in 
establishing itself in the field of internationally competitive services 
(banking, consulting, advertising etc.) that involve individual skills of 
highly-trained and mobile professionals. However, neither the newly-
created jobs in new fields of technology nor high-skilled jobs in services 
can absorb the increasing redundancy of older industrial workers. Second, 
growing automation and new procedures of production of the whole 
working process have disproportionately devaluated the technological 
skills of older people in traditional industries. Furthermore, the re-
organization of companies in hierarchies, created the demand for new 
qualification profiles (Snower, 1999). At the same time, the incentives for 
investing in the skill upgrading of older employees are fairly risky 
because of the few remaining years in service, fear of poaching, and 
abundant supply of well-qualified young people. 
Adjustment to new economic challenges in the UK occurs not only 
through the downsizing of redundant labor, but also by adjusting the 
earnings to workers’ productivity. In the UK, with an environment of 
weak trade unions, low-trust relationships, and weak EPL, earnings 
adjustments are more feasible than in coordinated market economies. 
Late careers and income dynamics 11 
While for internal market reasons, earnings rise with tenure in a 
company, the productivity rises at the beginning and the middle of the 
employment career and levels off later in life. Thus, the devaluation of 
human capital for older workers, coupled with low barriers for wage 
flexibility might have a negative impact on the income trajectories of 
older people. Furthermore, involuntary job mobility (direct or via a spell 
of inactivity) has a scarring effect on subsequent earnings. Studies for the 
UK report significant wage losses, especially for older workers, due to 
unemployment (Arulampalam, 2001; Arulampalam et al., 2001; Gregory 
& Jukes, 2001).  
The pension income of the post-employment career strongly depends 
not only on the kind of pension schemes workers paid in during their 
employment career, but also on their retirement behavior (though, of 
course predicted pension income influences retirement behavior). In the 
1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, there was a trend towards early 
exits, especially among men. Occupational pension schemes and the 
relatively generous public disability schemes encouraged this trend 
(Blundell & Johnson, 1999a). However, the restriction of disability 
schemes, reduction of the pension wealth for basic pension, as well as for 
SERPS, might delay retirement decisions for the youngest retirement 
cohorts. Furthermore, the economic upswing, low unemployment rates, 
and activation measures might improve the situation of older workers. 
However, as will be discussed in the next section, the flexibilization and 
recent pension reforms have different impacts on retirement behavior and 
pension income of various socio-economic groups.  
Patterns of social inequalities 
Although older workers display several ‘disadvantages’ when compared 
to middle age groups, lower-qualified workers might bear the main 
burden of economic changes and destabilization thesis might apply only 
for this group. First, the trade with low wage export countries accelerated 
the declining demand especially for unskilled work in the UK. The 
detailed analyses by Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) suggest that trade with 
these countries reduced the UK manufacturing employment share 
between 1992 and 2002 by about one quarter. At the same time, for every 
four to five manufacturing jobs that were lost, there was an average of 
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one new manufacturing job created through the export of high-skill-based 
manufactured goods (Rowthorn & Ramaswamy, 1999). Second, low-
qualified workers are very unlikely to secure the jobs in rapidly growing 
high skill services. Although the growth of service jobs also occurred at 
the low end of the qualification spectrum, service jobs in low-skilled 
services are rarely a promising alternative destination for redundant male 
industrial workers (Fagan et al., 2005). In contrast, non-employed women 
are about four times more likely to restart in (low-skilled) service jobs 
than men (Fagan et al., 2005). At the same time, low-skilled service jobs 
are associated with insecure positions and low wages. The stagnation of 
productivity in manufacturing and the growing supply of low-skilled 
labor paved the way for wage flexibility for low-skilled workers 
(Freeman & Katz, 1995). Indeed, studies report growing difference in 
earnings structured by education (Banks et al., 2002). Thus, lower-skilled 
workers might experience a higher risk of downward income shifts than 
high-skilled workers.  
With respect to the transition to retirement and pension income, the 
flexibilization of the labor market forced many low-qualified workers 
into inactivity. Since state benefits and disability pensions are less 
generous in the UK than in other European countries, the transition into 
retirement via an inactivity spell might be not the best option in terms of 
future pension income. Furthermore, fair actuarial adjustment for the 
early exits reduces pension income (of the second tier). Many low-
qualified persons work are in part-time jobs (mainly women) or in self-
employment (mainly men), which also might reduce pension income later 
in life. The pension reforms also disadvantaged especially lower-qualified 
individuals. The reforms aimed to increase participation rates and reduce 
expenditures for older workers by changing actuarial formulas for public 
pensions and shifting the emphasis to private pensions. The reforms 
reducing state pension benefits caused the average private pensions to 
grow much more quickly than state pensions (Disney et al., 2003). Given 
that more of higher earners than of lower earners have contracted out 
from state pensions, it is to be expected that the gap in pension income 
will widen across the cohorts. Furthermore, the increasing gap in working 
income has an impact on earning-related pensions and thus might also 
contribute to this trend.  
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DATA AND METHODS 
The data used in this study is based on the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS), which began in September 1991. Fifteen waves are 
available, providing information on the individual employment history, 
education, income and payment, as well as a detailed of information on 
individual characteristics. Additionally, retrospective data helps to 
reconstruct the employment histories of individuals (Halpin, 2000). The 
Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) of the University of 
Essex collected the data. The BHPS represents a national sample of 
households, including about 10,000 persons in approximately 5500 
households. The households of Northern Ireland and the North and West 
Highlands were initially excluded from the survey.  
Risk of becoming unemployed and income mobility: the analysis is 
based on workers, age 50, that were employed within the research 
window. We have constructed birth cohorts for when individuals reach 
age 50 and are in the following periods: 1) 1990-1994, characterized by 
economic stagnation and increase of unemployment rate, 2) 1995-1997, 
when GDP grew and unemployment fell steadily, 3) and 1998-2005, 
which saw the further decrease in unemployment rate and activation 
measures for older people.1 To investigate the destabilization of the late 
employment careers, the risk of becoming unemployed will be 
investigated. Income mobility will be the second step of this working 
paper. A change of gross hourly income between employment spells of 
more than 8 percent is defined as mobility. For the risk of becoming 
unemployed, we use single-episode transition models; for income 
mobility, we use competing risk multi-episode transition rate models 
(Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2002).  
Transition into retirement and pension income: The observational risk 
period for transition into retirement starts at age 55, regardless of whether 
the individual is in a job or not. Constructing the cohorts, we use the 
same periods as above: 1990-1994, 1995-1997, and 1998-2005.2 The 
                                                 
 
1 For unemployment and income mobility models these cohorts correspond 
following birth dates: 1940-1944, 1945-1947, and 1948-1955. 
2 For retirement and pension income these cohorts correspond following birth 
dates: 1935-1939; 1940-1942; and 1943-1950. 
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definition of retirement is complicated, since the concept of retirement 
may embody a number of different elements, such as complete and 
permanent withdrawal from employment, individual perception of 
retirement (self-reported employment status), and the receipt of pension 
income (private or from the state) (Banks & Smith, 2006). Since 
flexCAREER project aims to investigate the impact of the late employment 
career on work related pension income, we define retirement as the point 
at which individuals receive state, occupational or private personal 
schemes and are out of work (less than 10 hours per week). For these 
reasons, only state pension (first and second tier), pension from former 
employer, and private personal pension are considered to be pension 
income, while widow’s pension or disability benefits are not. This 
definition is also advantageous because different groups have different 
perception of retirement (Banks & Smith, 2006).  
As known from previous research, the human capital factor has an 
ambiguous impact on retirement processes: on the one hand, individuals 
with high human capital accumulate enough financial wealth by investing 
in personal and occupational pension schemes as well as in other assets 
(insurance, savings etc.), which allows them early retirement. Blundell et 
al. (2004) report that occupational provisions accelerate the retirement 
process close to retirement. On the other hand, opportunity costs of early 
retirement, especially of high-qualified workers, might delay retirement 
decisions even after official retirement age. Thus, higher pension wealth 
of some high-qualified individuals might accelerate their retirement 
transitions before official retirement age. For other high-qualified 
individuals, the income losses might delay their retirement decisions. In 
contrast, many low-qualified workers rely only on state pensions (basic 
pension or SERPS) or unfavorable occupational schemes and are 
supported by the state until official retirement age which, given our 
definition of retirement, might lead to an abrupt transition to retirement. 
Indeed, as Figure B 1 depicts (in Appendix B), the survivor function of 
women of higher occupational classes crosses the survivor function of 
those of lower occupational classes. For these reasons, the proportional 
hazard assumption might lead to heavily biased estimated effects. Thus, 
Late careers and income dynamics 15 
we will introduce models that allow the effect of covariates to vary over 
time (Blossfeld et al., 2006).3  
Pension income: The dataset contains all individuals who retired 
between 1990 and 2005. Since pension income in UK comes from several 
sources and thus might increase over the time, models are estimated by 
means of linear mixed random effect models (LMM) using monthly 
pension income. LMM are an appropriate method for treating Caussian 
repeated correlated outcomes (Molenberghs & Verbeke, 2005). The 
models deal with unbalanced data that covers at average 5 years of after 
getting retired. For the intercept and slope models for phases with 
incorporated covariates and  measurement 
occasions, we use the following notation: 
  
with intercept  and slope  depending on covariates 
. Random intercepts  and random slope  effects 
are assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variances σ0, σ1, 
and covariance σ10 and will be introduced if they improve the model fit. 
Since we have got unbalanced data, we use a 2 x 2 unstructured 
covariance matrix. Measurement error  is assumed to be independent of 
random effects  and normally distributed. Approaching the subject 
under study, we take into account the selection bias that might arise from 
the under-representation of low-qualified individuals in the sample: given 
our definition of retirement, low-qualified workers are less likely to retire 
within the observational window because of panel attrition combined 
with delayed transitions of low-qualified individuals. Low occupational 
                                                 
 
3 Different models have been fitted. Gompertz model provides the best fit: 
 The introduction of covariates in the 
shape parameter breaks with the proportional hazard assumption. While the scale 
parameter β is linear predictor in its scale parameter, the shape parameter gamma 
(γ) is not. To avoid complete misspecification of the hazard rate Gompertz model 
exponential piecewise constant models are also used for comparison  (Blossfeld 
et al., 2006). Another way to check for the proportionality assumption is to 
introduce interaction effects between time periods and occupational classes. 
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and private personal scheme coverage of low-qualified women might 
particularly bias the estimated effects.4  
Because we are interested in the timing of retirement and in how 
flexibilization impacts pension income, the following variables referring 
to the late employment career will be introduced in our models: number 
of employer changes, cumulative unemployment and inactivity 
experience, cumulative job experience in full-time, part-time, and self-
employment, self-reported health and financial situation, and marital and 
employment status of the partner. In addition to the covariates described 
above, we include the following covariates in the analysis: 1) region (four 
regions created from twelve official regions: North, South, Middle, 
Scotland), 2) education: dummy variables based on the CASMIN scale, 
3) occupational class based on the Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) 
classification, 4) regional unemployment rate (separate for men and 
women), 5) branch of industry (based on a modified Singelmann (1978) 
classification by collapsing transformative and distributive industries, and 
personal service and producer service industries). 
RESULTS 
Late careers since the 1990’s 
To gain the first insight into the employment careers of older workers we 
use sequence analysis starting at age 50. Figure 3 visualizes the sequence 
order for women and men. Of 1043 women in the sample about 800 
women are in employment at age 50. About 150 women are in family 
care and about 50 women reported to be disabled. The figures for men are 
                                                                                                              
 
However, such a model is less parsimonious and makes interpretation more 
complicated. 
4 To deal with possible bias we construct a covariate lambda as inverse Mills’ 
ratio (also known as Heckmans’ two step sample correction model). The lambda 
is constructed from the first-stage retirement model. For the proper identification 
of the second-stage model the first-stage model should superset the factors of the 
first-stage model. Therefore we introduce additional covariates which influence 
the probability to belong to the sample but which can be omitted in the second-
stage equation. These covariates include health status, marital status, ethnicity 
etc. 
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similar to those for women with the exception of family care. Given a 
smaller starting sample for men than for women (874 to 1043 persons), 
more men are employed at the age of 50 than women.  
Since the focus of this study is later employment careers, we shall take 
closer look at the most frequent career patterns. For both sexes the most 
frequent sequence that follows employment sequence is retirement. 
About one fifth of individuals in the initial sample retire during the 
observation window. Unemployment sequence is the second most 
frequent sequence after employment sequence and men are more likely to 
become unemployed than women. However, a large portion of the men 
and women who become unemployed also manage to get reemployed. In 
Figure 4 we plotted the sequence order not only according to the 
frequency but also according to the age at which individuals change their 
occupational states. As Figure 4 demonstrates the majority of men (and 
women) become unemployed in their early 50’s. It is remarkable that 
many men and women retire before their official retirement age. It is also 
noteworthy that some women work beyond their official retirement age.  
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Figure 3: Sequence order for women and men starting at age 50 
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Figure 4: Sequence order differentiated for age for women and men starting at 
age 50  
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Risk of becoming unemployed 
Across the cohorts the situation improved for older men, but has not 
changed much for women (Table 1 Model 1). These results contradict the 
destabilization thesis. However, we should keep in mind that 
deindustrialization began already in the mid-1970s and achieved its peak 
in the early-1980s. Thus, most individuals with weak attachment to the 
labor market were supposedly already out of the labor force before they 
turned age 50 and reached the research window. For these reasons we 
estimated the probability to belong to the sample (Appendix: Table A 1). 
Indeed, the probability of belonging to the sample is 38 percentage points 
(discrete change of probability)5 lower for women with primary 
education, 30 percentage points lower with basic vocational education, 
and 18 percentage points lower with technical secondary education than 
for those women with tertiary education. Men with primary and basic 
vocational education are also statistically significantly less likely to 
belong to the sample than men with tertiary education (18 percentage 
points with primary and 14 percentage points with basic vocational 
education). Because low-qualified workers have already been flexibilized 
before the start of our research window, the interaction effects between 
cohorts and occupational class are unlikely to yield changes in social 
inequality.  
Who is at risk of becoming unemployed? First of all, permanent and 
part-time contracts reduce the risk of becoming unemployed for both 
sexes (Table 1 Model 3). Second, previous unemployment experience and 
frequent change of employers increases the risk of becoming 
unemployed. Third, though many workers with weak attachment to the 
labor market (low-qualified individuals) were already ‘flexibilized’ and 
thus are not in the analysis sample, there is clear evidence that a lower 
occupational standing reduces the chance of remaining in employment. 
Skilled manual and unskilled female manual workers display higher risks 
                                                 
 
5 Discrete change of probability is calculated as a difference between predicted 
probability of an independent variable x and the probability when this variable 
changes its value holding all other variables at their mean. 
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of becoming unemployed than the service occupational class (Model 2). 
For men, the occupational class effect is less pronounced: qualified 
routine non-manual and skilled manual workers are more likely to 
become unemployed than service class workers.   
Upward and downward income mobility 
While upward mobility increased for both sexes, there are no clear results 
for downward mobility (Appendix A: Table A 2 and Table A 3). While 
there is a perfectly linear trend of upward and downward mobility for 
women, the effect for men levels out (compare LL between Model 2 and 
Model 3).6  
Upward and downward mobility is clearly structured by occupational 
class for both sexes. Compared to the service class, all other occupational 
classes display either lower upward mobility, higher downward mobility, 
or both (Table 2, Table 3, Model 2). Low-qualified workers have 
especially high rates of downward mobility. There is also some evidence 
that over time low-qualified workers are less likely to move upward than 
high-qualified workers. In contrast, high- and low-service class have 
experienced even the increase of earnings over the cohorts (main effect 
cohort metric in Model 4). 
Change of an employer increases both upward and downward mobility.  
 
Transition into retirement 
The early transition into retirement slightly decreased over cohorts 
(Figure 5 and Table 4 Model 1). As argued in the theoretical part, this 
might be the effect of reforms that induced individuals to delay their 
retirement, coupled with a favorable opportunity structure on the labor 
market. For both sexes, the highest numbers of labor market exits 
coincide with the official retirement age (See age effects: Table A 4 in 
Appendix A).  
                                                 
 
6 Because the squared effect of the variable cohort improves data fit for the 
mobility of men in the following models, metric squared variable is omitted for 
women. 
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As we argued in the methodical part, predictors reflecting wealth and 
human capital might bias the estimated effects because of the inadequacy 
of the proportional hazard rate specification. For this reason, we 
estimated the Gompertz model, introducing the shape parameter gamma 
for occupational classes and for pension schemes, when necessary (To 
understand the problematic, the exponential piecewise constant and 
Gompertz models are shown in Table A 5 Appendix A and described in 
footnote 7).  
                                                 
 
7 The Model 4 in Table A 5 shows the Gompertz model without covariates in the 
shape parameter gamma. The positive effect of the constant of the scale 
parameter gamma indicates the increasing retirement rates with increasing age, 
which corresponds to the age effects of the exponential piecewise constant model 
(Model 1). Model 1 and Model 2 assume proportional hazard process among 
different occupational classes. In Model 5 the effect of occupational groups is 
allowed to vary over time. According to the gamma coefficients, all occupational 
classes below service class display accelerating transition rates into retirement. 
Thus, the proportional hazard assumption biases estimated effects in the scale 
parameter (compare Model 3 and Model 5). Indeed, non-nested model tests with 
the Bayesian index criterion (BIC) and Akaike information criterion (AIC) show 
a much better model fit for Model 5 than for Model 3. 
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Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for retirement transitions 
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Which factors influence retirement behavior? First, compared to the 
service class, individuals in lower occupational classes are less likely to 
retire early (Model 2). This effect is especially pronounced for women. 
However, lower occupational class in the shape parameter gamma has an 
accelerating effect on the transition into retirement. These results are in 
line with the theoretical argumentation. While at the beginning of the 
process only high-qualified women have an option of early retirement 
(via occupation or private pension schemes), lower-qualified women have 
to delay their retirements or have to rely on state benefits. As time passes 
by, the probability of retiring for women from lower occupational classes 
increases relative to service class women (shape parameter gamma). As 
can be seen in Figure B 1 (Appendix B), the survivor function drops more 
abruptly at age 60 for all occupational classes lower than the service 
class. Fair actuarial adjustments for deferrals, coupled with high earnings, 
encourages many high-qualified women to delay their retirement 
decisions even after the official retirement age. Furthermore, some 
occupational pension schemes have leaving ages of sixty-two or sixty-
three. Given that a pensionable age of 60 is also associated with a 
reduction of statutory employment protection, high-qualified women 
have the option of remaining in employment while abrupt retirement for 
low-qualified women indicates the push mechanism for these women.  
The picture for men is similar to women’s transitions (Table 4, Model 2). 
However, there is only a slight overlap of retirement rates between 
different occupational classes, because far more men are covered by 
occupational and personal pension schemes (Figure B 1 in Appendix B). 
It implies that early retirement options (voluntary or involuntary) are 
more evenly distributed among men than women. Individuals below the 
service class display lower retirement rates than the service class (Table 
4, Model 2). We interpret it with the wealth hypothesis. High-qualified 
individuals are able to accumulate enough pension wealth in the form of 
occupational and personal pensions and various additional assets 
(savings, insurance etc.), and they are more likely to achieve the pension 
entitlements. Thus, high pension wealth pulls them into early retirement. 
We also estimated the effects of the changes for occupational classes over 
time. There is no clear evidence of change in either direction (Model not 
shown).  
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With respect to job histories, family care, unemployment, and inactivity 
spells accelerate the retirement transitions for women and spell of 
inactivity for men. Changing employers during the risk period (starting at 
the age of 55) delays retirement decisions. This might have a negative 
effect on pension income, but only for people with occupational pension 
schemes.  
Finally, the kind of pension schemes, that individuals have during their 
late working career, and financial situation have a significant effect on 
their retirement behavior. Individuals with an occupational pension 
scheme or being in a good self-reported financial situation display higher 
transition rates into retirement before the statutory retirement age, but 
lower rates thereafter (Model 4). The mechanism behind these results is 
similar to that of occupational classes (for women). While for 
unobservable reasons some high earners speed up early retirements, 
others delay their retirement decisions. Apparently, individuals of both 
groups of this subpopulation have the option of deciding whether they 
want to retire earlier or later. In contrast, low earners without such 
pensions or in bad financial situation are neither able to retire earlier nor 
to delay their retirement decisions.  
Private personal pensions (usually DC based plans) display lower 
transition rates than occupational pension schemes (DB based plans). As 
argued above, delayed retirements for individuals with DC plans is a 
result of lower pension wealth of the DC plans compared to the DB plans.  
Finally, we estimated couple retirement. Neither marital status nor the 
employment status of the spouse play any important role for retirement 
processes (Model not shown).  
Pension income 8 
We observe an increase of pension income across the cohorts (Table 5, 
Model 1). We interpret the increase of pension income as a result of the 
                                                 
 
8 To ensure the stability for  parameters we estimated the models 
using both sexes. The estimated effects for women are less pronounced than for 
men but display similar signs as for men. Where coefficients display different 
signs we introduced interaction effects. Models for both sexes are available upon 
request. 
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increasing share of individuals with occupational pension and private 
pension schemes.  
As shown in Table 5 (Model 2), pension income is clearly structured by 
qualifications.9 Higher educated people not only have higher pension 
receipts at the point of retirement ( ), but they also display higher 
growth rates ( ) in their post-employment life (Model 3). 
The results in the following models clearly demonstrate the widening gap 
over time in income provisions among individuals belonging to different 
educational groups (Table 5 Model 4). Compared to tertiary education, 
individuals holding all other educational degrees lose about 22 pounds a 
year when receiving their first pension income, which amounts to 330 
pounds within the observation window (1990-2005). In Model 5 the rate 
of change for educational groups was multiplied with cohort metric. As 
Model 5 demonstrates, not only the pension receipts at the time of 
retirement have changed over cohorts but also the rate of change. This 
means that over time each new cohort of better-educated people 
experiences a higher growth than lower-educated individuals. Using 
Model 5 we plotted the pension income development for different cohorts 
and educational groups starting at the time when individuals retire and 
following them the next 5 years. For the retiring cohort 1990-1994 we 
observe differences at the point of retirement but there is no striking 
difference concerning pension growth (Figure 6). The picture changes 
dramatically over the cohorts. For the retiring cohort 1998-2005 not only 
the gap at the point of retirement increased significantly between the 
educational groups but also the pension growth. Especially individuals 
holding tertiary degree gained in pension growth compared to the 
previous cohorts. For other educational groups there is no increase of 
pension growth between the cohorts (Figure 6). 
The gap in pension receipts at the very beginning of the retirement 
process has increased between different educational groups for several 
reasons. As we argued in the theoretical part, not all workers have 
profited from pension reforms. The fact that the low-qualified are more 
                                                 
 
9 Since the last occupational class might not be representative for the whole later 
employment career, we decided to use the educational. However, the effects for 
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likely only to receive a state pension (first or second tier) in comparison 
to higher qualified workers and since non-state pensions grow much more 
quickly than state pensions explains the widening income gap between 
cohorts. Furthermore, a large variety of occupational pensions operate 
using ‘bad’ scheme provisions for the lower-qualified and ‘good’ 
schemes for better-qualified individuals, which also contributes to 
increasing cleavages between educational groups. The striking change in 
pension income growth for tertiary education we trace back to increasing 
diversification of pension income sources. While lower-qualified 
individuals rely mainly on state pension (first or second tier), the higher-
qualified increasingly receive their pension income from several sources. 
They are more likely to receive occupational pension and to receive it 
from different several employers. Since 1988 they are also more likely to 
contribute to defined-contribution (DC) pension schemes (personal or 
stakeholder pensions).     
In our theoretical part, we also argued that the destabilization of late 
careers might also have a negative effect on pension income. Indeed, each 
month of inactivity and/or unemployment has a scarring effect on the 
pension income (Model 6). Interruptions in employment in the form of 
the family care reduce future pension income for women (Model not 
shown). Changing employers close to retirement only has a scarring 
effect on subsequent pension income for men (model not shown). We 
trace this effect back to the penalties arising from reduction of 
occupational pensions when changing firms or companies. A full-time 
contract in one's last job and working in producer service industries 
increase pension income. Being a married woman reduces pension 
income. 
                                                                                                              
 
occupational class display similar coefficients. Results for occupational class are 
available upon request. 
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Figure 6: Predicted values for different educational groups and cohorts (in 
Pounds) 
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SUMMERY AND DISCUSSION  
In this paper we investigated pre-retirement and post-retirement phases in 
the UK, taking into account institutional and historical developments. For 
the first phase we addressed the question whether the demand for flexible 
forms of work has destabilized late careers in UK. In this respect we 
specifically focused on the question of which groups bear the main 
burden of the increasing demand for flexibility. Transition to retirement 
was also given a prominent place in this paper. For the second phase we 
investigated the impact of flexibilization and recent reforms on pension 
income development with an emphasis on social inequalities in later life.  
Using the destabilization thesis, we argued that older people might bear a 
disproportionate part of flexibilization of the labor market. The main 
findings concerning social changes in a late career were that the situation 
improved for older men with respect to the unemployment risk. There is 
also clear evidence for an overall increase of upward mobility but no 
clear evidence for the increase of overall downward mobility. At first 
glance, these results contradict the destabilization thesis. However, as we 
argued in theoretical part, the destabilization thesis might apply in the 
first instance for low-qualified individuals since the demand shift towards 
high-skill-based manufactured goods and the creation of high-skill 
service jobs especially devaluated the job skills of lower-educated older 
workers (Fagan et al., 2005). Because deindustrialization began before 
our research window, most individuals with weak attachment to the labor 
market were already ‘flexibilized’. Already at the risk set (at age 50) the 
probability of belonging to employment sample is much lower for lower-
qualified than for higher-qualified people. Even though the lower-
qualified have already been ‘flexibilized’ before turning 50 (and thus are 
not in the sample analysis), the lower-qualified workers are less likely to 
move upward but display higher hazard rate to move downward or to 
become unemployed than higher-qualified workers.  
With respect to the transition to retirement we demonstrated that high-
qualified men and women have an option of early retirement (via 
occupation or private pension schemes), while for lower-qualified men 
and women such an option is rather limited. At the same time, higher-
Late careers and income dynamics 29 
qualified persons also have the option to delay their retirement. High 
earnings and an increase in earnings for higher-qualified individuals even 
after the age of 50, coupled with fair actuarial adjustments for deferrals, 
have especially encouraged many high-qualified women to delay their 
retirement decisions even after the official retirement age. Thus, the 
lower-qualified are rather pushed into early retirement and thus have to 
accept the reduction of pension provisions in the future. In contrast, for 
the higher-qualified it is rather the matter of decision for timing of 
retirement.   
Though private pension provisions and the spread of occupational 
pensions allow early retirement, there is an overall trend towards pension 
deferrals for all educational groups. Thus, pension reforms aiming at 
delaying retirement decisions seem to display their effect. However, as 
we argued in theoretical part, these reforms disadvantage especially low-
qualified workers since many of higher-qualified workers have contracted 
out from state pension that yield lower pension provisions than private 
based pensions. Furthermore, lower-qualified are more likely to get 
‘flexibilized’ and to contribute to pension system. They have to rely 
either on the basic state pension or on means-tested benefits, both of 
which are extremely low in UK. Indeed, as the Figure 6 demonstrates, 
there is a widening gap in pension income not only at the time point of 
retirement but also in later life.  
To summarize the results, we found that an increasing demand for 
flexibilization and implementation of pension reforms has  a different 
impact on different groups. For the higher-qualified we could not find 
any evidence for the deterioration of their situation in the late 
employment career. Considering the pension income their situation 
improved considerably over time. In contrast, the low-qualified workers 
face a double problem. On the one hand, they are confronted with higher 
risks of becoming economically inactive because the rapid decline of the 
manufacturing sector and profound technological changes have especially 
devaluated the skills of low-qualified workers. At the same time, the 
expanding service sector is not an alternative for low-qualified workers. 
On the other hand, recent market oriented reforms have also had a 
negative effect on the pension income for low-qualified workers since the 
pension systems have been designed for typical male career profiles with 
continuous full-time employment careers.  
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Table 1: Risk of the first unemployment after age of 50 (exponential piecewise constant model) 
 
 Women Men 
 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 
Baseline         
  Age 50-52 -5.56*** -5.80*** -2.41** -2.68*** -5.49*** -5.76*** -1.04 -1.31+ 
  Age 52-54 -5.46*** -5.70*** -2.31** -2.59*** -5.41*** -5.67*** -0.82 -1.12 
  Age 54-56 -5.41*** -5.66*** -2.17** -2.51*** -5.58*** -5.84*** -0.96 -1.29 
  Age 56+     -5.59*** -5.89*** -1.09 -1.52+ 
Cohorts (ref: 1990-94)         
  1995-1997 -0.33+ -0.28 -0.29 -0.35+ -0.73** -0.73** -0.68** -0.70** 
  1998-2005 0.26 0.30+ 0.37* 0.24 -0.51* -0.49* -0.57** -0.56* 
Occupational class (ref: Service class)         
  Qualified routine non-manual  -0.06 -0.20 -0.22  0.86** 0.37 0.32 
  Unqualified routine non-manual  0.30 0.08 0.02  0.47 0.29 0.24 
  Skilled manual workers  0.82** 0.78* 0.56+  0.40* 0.33 0.36 
  Unskilled manual workers  0.64** 0.30 0.23  0.28 0.09 0.07 
Full vs. part   -0.77*** -0.65***   -1.42*** -1.36** 
Self employed   -1.39*** -1.23***   -2.37*** -2.16*** 
Permanent   -1.42*** -1.34***   -1.70*** -1.58*** 
Size         
  24-200   -0.18 -0.13   0.03 0.07 
  200-1000   -0.09 -0.01   -0.46 -0.42 
  1000 and more   -0.59+ -0.57   -0.08 -0.06 
Branch of industry (ref: Public)         
  Transformative   0.12 0.09   0.25 0.20 
  Distributive   0.36 0.33   0.29 0.21 
  Production service   0.11 0.06   0.00 -0.05 
  Social and personal service   0.04 -0.03   -0.06 -0.10 
  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 Women Men 
 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4  Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 Mod 4 
Married   -0.06 -0.06   -0.26 -0.19 
Health (ref. bad)   -1.21*** -1.24***   -1.76*** -1.79*** 
White   -0.24 -0.31   -0.02 -0.06 
Region (ref: South)         
  Middle   -0.41* -0.37+   0.21 0.17 
  North   -0.10 -0.04   0.20 0.21 
  Scotland   0.20 0.16   0.31 0.31 
Regional unemployment rate    -0.13+    0.07 
Employer change (time varying)    0.15*    0.20* 
Inactivity experience before at risk:         
  Inactivity    0.00    -0.02 
  Family care    0.00***    0.00 
  Unemployment    0.01***    0.01** 
Subjects 744 744 744 744 712 712 712 712 
Failure 200 198 198 198 141 140 140 140 
Log likelihood -581.79 -570.29 -521.36 -511.40 -441.41 -435.86 -384.98 -379.74 
AIC 1173.58 1158.59 1092.72 1080.81 894.82 891.72 821.96 819.47 
BIC 1206.69 1218.19 1258.28 1272.86 934.78 958.32 995.12 1019.27 
 
Table 2: Probability of upward income mobility (exponential piecewise constant model with time varying covariates) 
 Women upward Men upward 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Baseline          
  Age 50-52 -3.853*** -3.606*** -3.965*** -3.992*** -3.787*** -3.641*** -4.756*** -4.818*** 
  Age 52-54 -3.625*** -3.375*** -3.715*** -3.737*** -3.629*** -3.483*** -4.576*** -4.637*** 
  Age 54-56 -3.732*** -3.479*** -3.799*** -3.815*** -3.656*** -3.503*** -4.567*** -4.630*** 
  Age 56-58 -3.535*** -3.284*** -3.572*** -3.582*** -3.584*** -3.429*** -4.449*** -4.513*** 
  Age 58+ -3.613*** -3.359*** -3.621*** -3.623*** -3.530*** -3.375*** -4.341*** -4.415*** 
Hourly earnings -0.074*** -0.091*** -0.101*** -0.105*** -0.061*** -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.072*** 
Cohort, metric 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.087*** 0.113*** 0.134*** 0.139*** 0.183*** 0.199*** 
Cohort metric square     -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Occupational class (ref: Service class)         
  Qualified routine non-manual  -0.306*** -0.223** 0.093  -0.068 -0.137 -0.054 
  Unqualified routine non-manual  -0.155+ -0.095 0.086  -0.068 -0.091 0.125 
  Skilled manual workers  -0.300* -0.130 0.514+  -0.220** -0.216* 0.041 
  Unskilled manual workers  -0.205+ -0.179 -0.180  -0.165 -0.186 -0.369+ 
Cohort x Occupation (ref: Service class)         
  Qualified routine non-manual    -0.046*    -0.013 
  Unqualified routine non-manual    -0.027    -0.039 
  Skilled manual workers    -0.103**    -0.040* 
  Unskilled manual workers    0.004    0.028 
Part (ref. full)   -0.020 -0.018   0.130 0.132 
Permanent   -0.104 -0.101   0.290 0.278 
Size         
  24-200   -0.037 -0.047   0.140 0.140 
  200-1000   -0.107 -0.131   -0.015 -0.019 
  1000 and more   0.128 0.125   0.025 0.036 
 
  
 Women upward Men upward 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Branch of industry (ref: Public)         
  Transformative   0.043 -0.066   0.022 -0.002 
  Distributive   0.183 0.095   0.079 0.053 
  Production service   0.184 0.076   0.169 0.145 
  Social and personal service   0.326+ 0.258   -0.093 -0.116 
Married   -0.002 -0.009   0.053 0.061 
Health (ref. bad)   -0.169 -0.183   -0.056 -0.048 
White   0.077 0.051   0.126 0.138 
Region (ref: South)         
  Middle   0.037 0.025   -0.083 -0.081 
  North   0.032 0.024   -0.108 -0.099 
  Scotland   0.087 0.085   0.010 -0.011 
Regional unemployment rate    0.003    0.067** 
Employee change (time varying)   0.103*** 0.109***   0.099** 0.101** 
Subjects 686 686 686 686 579 579 579 579 
Failure 901 901 901 901 713 713 713 713 
Log likelihood -1049.967 -1044.538 -1032.326 -1028.396 -825.552 -822.693 -808.289 -806.253 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 3: Probability of downward income mobility (exponential piecewise constant model with time varying covariates) 
 Women downward Men downward 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Baseline          
  Age 50-52 -4.636*** -5.092 *** -3.883*** -3.752*** -4.690*** -5.281*** -5.595*** -5.648 *** 
  Age 52-54 -4.604*** -5.069 *** -3.830*** -3.692*** -4.425*** -5.013*** -5.302*** -5.357 *** 
  Age 54-56 -4.556*** -4.995 *** -3.758*** -3.624*** -4.616*** -5.229*** -5.496*** -5.552 *** 
  Age 56-58 -4.699*** -5.149 *** -3.908*** -3.780*** -4.555*** -5.182*** -5.436*** -5.494 *** 
  Age 58+ -4.527*** -5.021 *** -3.774*** -3.633*** -4.546*** -5.186*** -5.453*** -5.515 *** 
Hourly earnings 0.052*** 0.069 *** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.041*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068 *** 
Cohort, metric 0.005 0.007 0.025 0.002 0.042 0.033 0.080* 0.098 * 
Cohort, metric square     -0.004+ -0.004 -0.005+ -0.006 * 
Occupational class (ref: Service class)         
  Qualified routine non-manual  0.348 ** 0.370** 0.325  0.657*** 0.561*** 0.616 * 
  Unqualified routine non-manual  0.477 *** 0.417** 0.161  0.548*** 0.478*** 0.567 ** 
  Skilled manual workers  0.943 *** 0.853*** 0.670*  0.695*** 0.672*** 0.822 *** 
  Unskilled manual workers  0.670 *** 0.569*** 0.179  0.794*** 0.760*** 1.169 *** 
Cohort x Occupation (ref: Service class)         
  Qualified routine non-manual    0.005    -0.008 
  Unqualified routine non-manual    0.038    -0.013 
  Skilled manual workers    0.030    -0.023 
  Unskilled manual workers    0.064+    -0.069 + 
Part (ref. full)   0.297* 0.316**   0.598+ 0.605 + 
Permanent   -0.574** -0.559**   -0.383* -0.396 * 
Size         
  24-200   -0.164+ -0.165+   -0.014 -0.017 
  200-1000   -0.048 -0.056   -0.120 -0.126 
  1000 and more   -0.190 -0.179   -0.302+ -0.325 + 
 
  
 Women downward Men downward 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
Branch of industry (ref: Public)         
  Transformative   -0.108 -0.115   0.167 0.168 
  Distributive   -0.040 -0.026   0.278* 0.273 * 
  Production service   -0.209 -0.206   0.016 0.029 
  Social and personal service   -0.064 -0.064   0.132 0.154 
Married   -0.080 -0.088   0.119 0.117 
Health (ref. bad)   0.037 0.045   -0.046 -0.041 
White   -0.585*** -0.590***   0.080 0.060 
Region (ref: South)         
  Middle   0.185+ 0.167   -0.097 -0.091 
  North   0.148 0.149   -0.092 -0.084 
  Scotland   0.124 0.123   0.087 0.095 
Regional unemployment rate    -0.003    0.045 * 
Employee change (time varying)   0.062 0.066   0.122** 0.123 ** 
Subjects 686 686 686 686 579 579 579 579 
Failure 573 573 573 573 505 505 505 505 
Log likelihood -922.786 -905.382 -883.796 -881.870 -759.618 -736.992 -720.190 -719.051 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 4: Transition into retirement: Gompertz and exponential piecewise constant model 
 Women Men 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cohorts (ref: 1990-94)         
  1995-1997 0.06 -0.06 -0.20 -0.19 -0.15 -0.40* -0.31+ -0.28 
  1998-2005 -0.11 -0.16 -0.33* -0.38* -0.30* -0.52** -0.48* -0.44* 
Occupational class (ref: Service class)         
  Qualified routine non-manual  -0.47 -0.52+ -0.71*  -1.20 -1.30+ -1.15 
  Unqualified routine non-manual  -0.61* -0.60+ -0.70*  -1.03+ -1.00+ -0.84 
  Skilled manual workers  -2.28*** -2.43*** -2.64***  -1.56*** -1.26** -0.90* 
  Unskilled manual workers  -0.96** -1.34*** -1.25**  -0.75 -0.62 -0.38 
Full   -0.34** -0.35**   0.30 0.28 
Self employed   -0.40 -0.26   -0.31 0.02 
Permanent   -0.10 -0.23   0.12 0.06 
Branch of industry (ref: Public)         
  Transformative   0.63* 0.69*   -0.33 -0.40 
  Distributive   0.55+ 0.49   -0.06 -0.07 
  Production service   0.71* 0.72*   0.18 0.15 
  Social and personal service   0.84** 0.76*   0.37 0.27 
Health (ref. bad)   -0.26 -0.22   -0.43+ -0.47* 
White   -0.10 -0.02   -0.45 -0.31 
Region (ref: South)         
  Middle   -0.02 -0.04   -0.15 -0.14 
  North   -0.17 -0.18   0.15 0.08 
  Scotland   -0.72** -0.88**   -0.55+ -0.65* 
Regional unemployment rate    0.04    0.03 
Employer change since 1978 (time varying)a   -0.02 -0.03   -0.02 0.00 
 
  
 Women Men 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Working experience before at risk         
  Self-employed   0.00 -0.00   -0.00* -0.00 * 
  Self-employee with employers   0.00 0.00   -0.00 0.00 
  Part-time   0.00*** 0.00*   -0.00 -0.00 
  Full-time   0.00*** 0.00***   -0.00 -0.00 
Incidence at risk         
  Inactivity    0.40**    0.38 + 
  Unemployment    0.08    -0.10 
  Family care    -0.23+    0.51 
Pension paid in while working (ref. state pension)         
Occupational scheme    0.61*    1.75 *** 
Private personal pension    -0.41*    -0.93 *** 
Financial situation (ref. bad)    0.68*    0.42 * 
Constant -5.39*** -5.60*** -6.10*** -5.98*** -4.61*** -5.27*** -5.01*** -6.22 *** 
Gamma          
Occupational class (ref: Service class)         
  Qualified routine non-manual  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***  0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Unqualified routine non-manual  0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***  0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Skilled manual workers  0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***  0.01** 0.02** 0.01 * 
  Unskilled manual workers  0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03***  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Pension paid in while working (ref. state pension)         
Occupational scheme    -0.01*    -0.00 + 
Private personal pension    0.01    0.01 ** 
Financial situation (ref. bad)    -0.01**     
Constant 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00* 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03 *** 
Subjects 830 830 830 830 703 703 703 703 
Failure 477 477 477 477 335 335 335 335 
Log likelihood -652.27 -617.29 -581.22 -570.32 -796.72 -775.58 -721.96 -701.95 
 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 5: Growth curve models for pension growth after retirement for men and women 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Pension at retirement       
Cohort, metric 12.92*** 11.15*** 11.23*** 33.68*** 29.34*** 28.70*** 
Age at retirement -0.49 2.26 2.31 2.49 2.57+ 3.81* 
Women -303.05*** -281.42*** -267.68*** -269.81*** -268.81*** -123.72*** 
Education (ref. tertiary)       
  Primary education  -421.12*** -391.64*** -177.08* -196.64** -167.87* 
  Basic vocational education  -369.51*** -338.61*** -136.66+ -156.80* -150.58* 
  Technical secondary  -257.34*** -234.88*** -37.19 -60.05 -65.76 
  Academic secondary  -189.17*** -166.73*** 28.06 8.99 6.13 
Cohort x Education (ref. tertiary)       
  Primary education    -25.21*** -21.24** -18.16** 
  Basic vocational education    -23.32** -18.56* -15.72* 
  Technical secondary    -22.88** -17.93* -15.35* 
  Academic secondary    -22.13** -17.89* -17.27* 
Inactivity gaps since age 50       
Inactivity duration        -0.24+ 
Family duration care        -0.38 
Unemployment duration        -1.95** 
Number of  employee changes      2.60 
Health (1=good)      19.97 
White       110.23+ 
Married      44.65+ 
Married women      -174.97*** 
Lambda      146.10 
Branch of industry (ref. Public)       
  Transformative      -15.17 
  Distributive      -3.51 
  Production service      77.41* 
  Social and personal service      -20.84 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Region (ref. South)       
  Middle      -15.29 
  North      -36.05+ 
  Scotland      -30.89 
Permanent      13.25 
Full vs. part      85.48*** 
Self employed      6.13 
Constant 518.19*** 670.45*** 633.32*** 427.24*** 442.00*** 154.36 
Rate of change       
Women x time   -1.31*** -1.32*** -1.34*** -1.47*** 
Education x Time (ref. tertiary)       
  Primary education   -1.97*** -1.99*** -0.12 -0.16 
  Basic vocational education   -1.95*** -1.98*** 0.26 0.16 
  Technical secondary   -1.38** -1.39** 0.79 0.74 
  Academic secondary   -1.47** -1.49** 0.41 0.31 
Cohort  x Education x Time (ref. tertiary)       
  Time x Cohort     0.43*** 0.40*** 
  Primary education     -0.39*** -0.37*** 
  Basic vocational education     -0.48*** -0.45*** 
  Technical secondary     -0.47*** -0.44*** 
  Academic secondary     -0.39*** -0.35** 
Time 2.23*** 2.19*** 4.63*** 4.66*** 2.66*** 2.76*** 
Level 1 (l s.e.) 0.27** 0.27** 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 
Level 2 RI (l s.e.) 5.72*** 5.64*** 5.64*** 5.64*** 5.64*** 5.58*** 
Level 2 RS(l s.e.) 0.58*** 0.41** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.71** 0.66** 
Cov 5.46*** 5.46*** 5.46*** 5.46*** 5.46*** 5.46*** 
Number of subjects 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250 1250
Number of cases 9088 9088 9088 9088 9088 9088 
Log likelihood -64222.22 -64141.19 -64094.28 -64087.97 -64076.24 -63998.98 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table A 1: Logistic regression for probability to belong to the sample 
 Women Men 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Cohort, metric 0.03 * 0.09 + -0.00 -0.00 -0.07 -0.03 
Cohort, metric square -0.00 0.00  
Education (ref: tertiary)   
Primary  -1.89 ***  -1.26 ** 
Basic vocational education -1.37 ***  -0.95 * 
Technical secondary -0.88 *  -0.66 
Academic secondary -0.64  -0.04 
Constant 0.74 *** 0.52 * 2.31 *** 1.90 *** 2.17 *** 2.85 *** 
Subjects 1168 1168 1168 959 959 959 
Log likelihood -670.32 -669.40 -636.33 -376.81 -376.37 -364.25 
AIC 1344.64 1344.80 1284.67 757.63 758.75 740.51 
BIC 1354.76 1359.98 1315.05 767.36 773.35 769.70 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table A 2: Upward (exponential piecewise constant model) 
 Women upward Men upward 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Baseline         
  Age 50-52 -3.668*** -3.853*** -3.935*** -4.168*** -3.517*** -3.577*** -3.790*** -4.298*** 
  Age 52-54 -3.474*** -3.625*** -3.724*** -3.936*** -3.341*** -3.378*** -3.636*** -4.103*** 
  Age 54-56 -3.594*** -3.732*** -3.837*** -4.031*** -3.358*** -3.381*** -3.663*** -4.082*** 
  Age 56-58 -3.395*** -3.535*** -3.639*** -3.815*** -3.290*** -3.306*** -3.591*** -3.964*** 
  Age 58+ -3.482*** -3.613*** -3.701*** -3.854*** -3.256*** -3.301*** -3.537*** -3.845*** 
Cohorts (ref. 1990-94)         
  1995-1997 0.272***    0.256**    
  1998-2005 0.457***    0.231**    
Cohort, metric  0.061*** 0.098*** 0.110***  0.030*** 0.134*** 0.158*** 
Cohort, metric square   -0.003 -0.003   -0.008*** -0.008*** 
Hourly earnings -0.070*** -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
Regional unemployment rate    0.035    0.055** 
Subjects 686 686 686 686 579 579 579 579 
Failure 901 901 901 901 714 714 714 714 
Log likelihood -1054.339 -1049.967 -1049.218 -1048.492 -830.983 -831.908 -827.081 -824.122 
AIC 2124.678 2113.935 2114.436 2114.985 1677.966 1677.817 1670.161 1666.244 
BIC 2176.476 2159.257 2166.234 2173.257 1728.027 1721.620 1720.222 1722.563 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table A 3: Downward (exponential piecewise constant model) 
 Women downward Men downward 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Baseline         
  Age 50-52 -4.603*** -4.636*** -4.673*** -4.707*** -4.612*** -4.561*** -4.677*** -5.271*** 
  Age 52-54 -4.569*** -4.604*** -4.647*** -4.679*** -4.329*** -4.277*** -4.419*** -4.967*** 
  Age 54-56 -4.511*** -4.556*** -4.602*** -4.631*** -4.520*** -4.462*** -4.618*** -5.106*** 
  Age 56-58 -4.638*** -4.699*** -4.746*** -4.772*** -4.469*** -4.400*** -4.558*** -4.989*** 
  Age 58+ -4.489*** -4.527*** -4.566*** -4.589*** -4.460*** -4.414*** -4.548*** -4.900*** 
Cohorts (ref. 1990-94)         
  1995-1997 -0.082    0.027    
  1998-2005 0.071    -0.131    
Cohort, metric  0.005 0.022 0.024  -0.014 0.046 0.072* 
Cohort, metric square   -0.001 -0.001   -0.005+ -0.004+ 
Hourly earnings 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
Regional unemployment rate    0.005    0.065** 
Subjects 686 686 686 686 579 579 579 579 
Failure 573 573 573 573 508 508 508 508 
Log likelihood -921.974 -922.786 -922.685 -922.674 -764.295 -764.626 -763.450 -760.328 
AIC 1859.948 1859.572 1861.370 1863.348 1544.591 1543.252 1542.899 1538.657 
BIC 1911.746 1904.894 1913.167 1921.621 1594.652 1587.056 1592.960 1594.976 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 Table A 4: Transition into retirement (exponential piecewise constant model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Baseline       
Age 55-57 -5.11*** -5.09***  -4.84*** -4.82***  
Age 57-59 -6.13*** -6.15***  -5.53*** -5.52***  
Age 59-62 -3.90*** -3.98***  -4.96*** -4.96***  
Age 62-64    -5.17*** -5.15***  
Age 64+    -3.45*** -3.43***  
Cohorts (ref. 1990-94)       
  1995-1997 -0.16   -0.14   
  1998-2005 -0.42***   -0.38*   
Cohort, metric  0.06 -0.04*  -0.02 -0.04* 
Cohort, metric square  -0.01**   -0.00  
Constant   -5.39***   -5.34*** 
Gamma       
Constant   0.02***   0.01*** 
Subjects 831 831 831 703 703 703 
Failure 386 386 386 252 252 252 
Log likelihood -629.81 -623.76 -630.95 -575.77 -576.04 -604.97 
AIC 1269.63 1257.52 1267.90 1165.54 1166.08 1215.95 
BIC 1302.36 1290.24 1286.82 1211.04 1211.58 1234.73 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table A 5: Transition into retirement for women: comparison piecewise constant with Gompertz distribution models 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  
Baseline      
Age 55-57 -4.76*** -6.06*** -6.20***   
Age 57-58 -5.86*** -5.85*** -6.02***   
Age 58+ -3.41*** -3.41*** -3.57***   
Cohorts (ref: 1990-94)      
  1995-1997 -0.03 -0.08 -0.16+ -0.09 -0.19 
  1998-2005 -0.32*** -0.45*** -0.60*** -0.24+ -0.38 * 
Occupational class (ref: Service class)      
  Qualified routine non-manual  0.17 0.23 0.69*** -0.71 * 
  Unqualified routine non-manual  0.02 0.16 0.62*** -0.70 * 
  Skilled manual workers  0.12 0.24 0.82*** -2.64 *** 
  Unskilled manual workers  -0.03 0.06 0.52** -1.25 ** 
Full   -0.23* -0.24+ -0.35 ** 
Self employed   -0.16 -0.08 -0.26 
Permanent   -0.08 -0.25 -0.23 
Branch of industry (ref: Public)      
  Transformative   0.09 0.23 0.69 * 
  Distributive   -0.00 0.06 0.49 
  Production service   0.13 0.09 0.72 * 
  Social and personal service   0.16 0.40 0.76 * 
Married   -0.05 0.04 -0.10 
Health (ref. bad)   -0.13 -0.23 -0.22 
White   0.05 0.14 -0.02 
Finacial situation (1=good)   0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
Region (ref: South)      
  Middle   -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 
  North   -0.07 -0.31* -0.18 
  Scotland   -0.25+ -0.50* -0.88 ** 
Employer change since 1978 (time varying)a   -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
Working experience before at risk      
 
  Self-employment without employees   -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  Self-employment with employees   0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Part-time   0.00 0.00** 0.00 * 
  Full-time   0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 *** 
Incidence at risk:      
  Inactivity   0.35*** 0.36** 0.40 ** 
  Unemployment   -0.01 0.16 0.08 
  Familiy care   0.05 -0.08 -0.23 + 
Pension paid in while working (ref. state pension)      
  Occupational scheme   0.32** 0.30* 0.43 
  Private personal pension   -0.02 0.06 -0.41 
Constant    -7.15*** -5.98 *** 
Gamma      
Pension paid in while working (ref. state pension)      
  Occupational scheme     -0.00 + 
  Private personal pension     0.01 
Occupational class (ref: Service class)      
  Qualified routine non-manual     0.02 *** 
  Unqualified routine non-manual     0.02 *** 
  Skilled manual workers     0.06 *** 
  Unskilled manual workers     0.03 *** 
Constant    0.05*** 0.03 *** 
Subjects 830 732 732 732 732 
Failure 477 387 387 387 387 
Log likelihood -656.35 -337.12 -321.96 -286.76 -251.76 
AIC 1322.69 692.23 709.92 637.52 579.51 
BIC 1354.67 749.60 920.27 832.89 811.51 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Appendix B:  
Figure B 1: Survivor function for transition into retirement for men and women 
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